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attention to Asian agency complicate Herzstein’s understanding of Luce and
his agenda?
These comments, however, do not detract from the value of the book as it
now stands. This book is a special bonus for those who research the Cold War
in Asia, which is so often neglected in favour of the standoff in Europe. The
same readers, regardless of any eschewing of anti-communist propaganda of
the Cold War period, will find Luce a kind of hero as well, for here was a man
who clearly loved Asia (at least China) and always kept it at the centre of his
thinking. The present volume is also highly recommended reading for those
who want an inside look at one ‘theatre’ (the journalistic front) of the early
Cold War.
MICHAEL W. CHARNEY
GEOFFREY PARKER (ed.):
The Cambridge History of Warfare.
viii, 515 pp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. £13.99.
The present volume is divided into nineteen chapters with an introduction
and epilogue, covering developments in warfare from Ancient Greece to the
Gulf Wars. Geoffrey Parker, the editor, contributed the introduction and
conclusion, as well as three chapters (6, 7, and 9) and a chapter (17) co-written
by Parker and Williamson A. Murray. Other contributors include Victor Davis
Hanson (chapters 1–3), Bernard S. Bachrach (4), Christopher Allmand (5),
Patricia Seed (8), John A. Lynn (10 and 11), and Williamson A. Murray (12–
16). The volume is rounded off with useful supplementary material including a
lengthy chronology and a glossary.
The Cambridge History of Warfare amounts to a more than satisfactory
survey of the origins and development of Western warfare. There is a healthy
balance between specific details (provided with substantial economy) and gen-
eral trends, and the reader is not dragged through meticulous descriptions of
weaponry or repetitious biographical sketches of great conquerors (although
with occasional emphasis on a few key actors such as Bismarck and Sheridan).
Space does not allow a regurgitation of the myriad topics examined in the
volume. Nevertheless, one topic that is particularly well handled across many
of the chapters is the long, twisting evolution of fortifications which, after
minimal change for a thousand years from the late Roman period, underwent
substantial change in response to the impact of firearms. Interestingly, fortifi-
cations built by Europeans abroad were first arranged to defend against
sea attacks by other Europeans, rather than hostile advances by indigenous
forces from the hinterland. Attention to new Italian fortress designs after
the introduction of firearms and later by French engineers is presented in the
context of necessary manpower. As fortifications became better and more
easily defended, it increased exponentially the number of troops required to
bring a siege to fruition, leading to innovations in siege technology and tactics
to reduce the commitment of troops and expense associated with such a
campaign.
Nevertheless, the volume’s coverage is limited mainly to the West. Devel-
opments outside of Europe and North America are limited mainly to those
cases where and when Europeans brought their ships and guns to carve out
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colonies. The native North Americans, the Aztecs, and Incas do appear in
Seeds’ chapter, ‘The Conquest of the Americas’, as well as Sudanese, the Zulus
and the Vietnamese, among others (the Japanese expansion of World War II is
provided, but their military was built on the Western model), in later chapters,
but only as representatives of new challenges to European invaders and tech-
nology. The editor acknowledges this problem in the preface, but offers three
reasons for the European focus: (1) a single volume on military history could
not possibly cover the entire world satisfactorily; (2) a brief notice of non-
Western developments in the context of an overwhelming focus on the West
would present a great distortion; and (3) regardless of competing traditions,
Western warfare did win the globe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Hence, the ‘rise and development of this dominant tradition, together with the
secret of its success’ deserves ‘examination and analysis’ (p. vii). One would
expect that if this is the case the volume should have been entitled The Cam-
bridge History of European Warfare or at least retained the earlier subtitle of
The Triumph of the West for, in its present form, the title is very misleading.
No-one disagrees that Western warfare is worthy of examination, but one
wonders if this story needs to be told yet again (European military success is,
after all, a far from neglected theme in the literature and the coverage here,
especially in the second half of the volume is very familiar ground indeed) at
the expense of the rest of the world. The space devoted to the emergence of
Western warfare in the present volume could have been substantially reduced
to provide room for non-Western developments. Perhaps, a good beginning
could have been made with at least one chapter on non-Western warfare,
contrary to Parker’s initial suggestion, to allow the non-Western world some
space in their own history. Regarding Parker’s third justification, the present
reviewer has reservations as to whether the success of the West can really be
understood without a more thorough investigation of how indigenous warfare
emerged and why, in numerous encounters, Western warfare failed. The ability
of the Burmese to delay the British advance in the First Anglo-Burmese War,
the length of time it took to conclude the Java War, the much longer Aceh
war, and a significant Dutch defeat in Bali in the mid-nineteenth century, all
stress the need to understand the inadequacy of European armies in dealing
with indigenous armies at the time and how Europeans were forced to develop
new tactics and strategies, sometimes drawing upon indigenous technologies
and tactics to do so. Further, as indigenous armies adapted themselves to
Western warfare, many ‘Westernized’ indigenous armies fell very quickly and
easily to European forces in the late nineteenth century. Afterwards, however,
their rural (and hill) compatriots were able to hold off the Europeans for many
years by falling back on indigenous tactics and technology.
Within the limited, Western, scope of the volume, the treatment of devel-
opments in warfare is scholarly and makes for a very rewarding read. Its
arrangement and fine balance between details and narrative flow make it
especially suitable for classroom instruction at the undergraduate and
postgraduate levels. Indeed, the present reviewer expects to include this as
supplementary reading in his own warfare course to cover warfare beyond the
confines of Asia. The volume is thus recommended for researchers and
students of warfare with the caveat that some supplementary reading on non-
Western warfare should be undertaken if one desires a full and balanced
understanding of the history of warfare on a global scale.
MICHAEL W. CHARNEY
